RESTRICTED

MS # P-041 a

Burkhart MUELLER-HILLEBRAND
Generalmajor

OKH - Project

7

Translator: G. WEBER
Editor : H. HEITMAN
Reviewer : H. HEITMAN

HISTORICAL DIVISION
EUROPEAN COMMAND

RESTRICTED

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10501

GKH PROJECT # 7

MS No	Original Study Section and No	New Designation	Author	Title
P-041a ✓	A	Vol I	Halder and Mueller-Hillebrand	Foreword and a Survey of German Army High Command from 1938 to 1945; Interaction, Functions and Responsibilities of the Individual Sub-Divisions of GKH
P-041b ✓	B 1	Vol II	Zerbel	Organization and Working System of Central Command Agency of the Army (Organization of Army Quartermaster)
P-041c ✓	B 2 a	Vol III	v Gylden-feldt	Army High Commander & Adjutant Division
P-041d	B 2 b	Vol IV Chap I	Halder	Chief of the Army General Staff and Army General Staff Officers
	B 2 c	Chap II	Blumen-tritt	First Senior Staff Officer (Chief Qm I) Army High Command, Army General Staff
	B 2 d	Chap III	Zerbel	Second Senior Staff Officer (Chief Qm II) Army High Command, Army General Staff
	B 2 e	Chap IV	Zerbel	Third Senior Staff Officer (Chief Qm III) Army High Command, Army General Staff
	B 2 f	Chap V	-	Fourth Senior Staff Officer (Chief Qm IV) Army High Command, Army General Staff
✓	B 2 g	Chap VI	Erfurth	Fifth Senior Staff Officer (Chief Qm V) (Military History) Origin and Functions

	B 2 h	Chap VII	--	Quartermaster General; Chief, Army General Staff
	B 2 i	Chap VIII	Halder	Control of Army General Staff
P-041e	B 3	Vol V	v Greiffenberg	OKH, Operations Division; Army General Staff
P-041f	B 4	Vol VI	Mueller-Hillebrand	Organizational Problems of OKH from 1938 to 1945 and the Solutions found
P-041g	B 5	Vol VII	Roehricht	Training Problems of OKH
P-041h	B 6	Vol VIII	v.Tippelskirch	Intelligence on Foreign Armies and Military Foreign Service of OKH from 1938 to 1945
P-041i	B 6 a	Vol IX Chap I	v.Tippelskirch	OKH Intelligence Service Organization and Working System during Peace and the First Phases of the War
	B 6 b	Chap II	Matzky	Fourth Senior Staff Officer (Chief Qm IV) from 5 Jan 41 to 9 Nov 42, when this Division was dissolved
	B 6 c	Chap III	Metz	The Handling of Information on Foreign Armies in OKH after Dissolution of Fourth Senior Staff Officer (Chief Qm IV); Effects of this Measure
	B 6 d	Chap IV	Metz	Divisions East and West, Foreign Armies
P-041j	B 6 e	Vol X	v.Mellenthin	OKH Attache Sections (later Branches)
P-041k	B 7	Vol XI	Praun	OKH Signal Services. The Signal Services in the Service of OKH During World War II
P-041l	B 8	Vol XII	-	Representation of the Individual Arms in OKH

P-041m✓	B 8 a	Vol XIII	Jaenicke	Representation of Infantry Interests 1938 - 1945
P-041n	B 8 b	Vol XIV	Huebner & Berlin	Representation of Artillery Interests 1938 - 1945
P-041o	B 8 c	Vol XV	Jakob	Representation of the Interests of the Engineer Forces, 1938 - 1945
P-041p	B 8 d	Vol XVI	Guderian	Inspector General, Panzer Forces
P-041q	B 9	Vol XVII	Toppe	Organization, Working System and Effects of Army Quartermaster General during World War II
P-041r✓	B 10 a	Vol XVIII Chap I	Bork	OKH Transportation Services. The Chief of Transportation as Representative of OKH Interests: The Organization, Functions, and Facilities of this Agency, 1939 - 1942 in Transportation Matters
	B 10 b	Chap II	Koerner	OKH Transportation Services. The Chief of Transportation as Representative of OKH Interests. The Organization, Functions, and Facilities of this Agency 1942 - 1945 in Transportation Matters
P-041s✓	B 10 c	Vol XIX	v. Natzmer	OKH Transportation Services. The Field Transportation Branch and Its Function as Operations Staff of the Chief of Transportation and as Control Agency for Transportation of Men and Materials by Rail, Road, and Inland Waterways
P-041t✓	B 10 d	Vol XX	Klein	OKH Transportation Services. The Planning Branch of the Chief of Transportation, Its Missions and Its Work in the Planning and Reconstruction of the Russian Railway Network 1941 - 1942

P-041u ✓	B 10 e	Vol XXI	Teske	OKH Transportation Services; The Chief of Transportation as Representative of OKH. Interests in Transportation Matters. The Outlying Stations of the Chief of Transportation Affairs - Armed Forces Chief of Transportation, Transport Commander Office, General of Transportation Affairs and Authorized Transport Officer as Adviser to their Command Agency and in Executing Transportation Missions
P-041v	B 10f	Vol XXII	-	Not Compiled
P-041w	B 11	Vol XXIII	v.Klinkowstroem	Mapping and Surveying Facilities Available to OKH (50 Co RFD Board
P-041x	B 12 a	Vol XXIV	Kleikamp	Central Affairs Division in OKH: Functions, Integration, Facilities and Possibilities
P-041y	B 12 b	Vol XXV	-	OKH: General for Special Missions
P-041z	B 12 c	Vol XXVI	-	OKH: Army Affairs Department
P-041aa	B 12 d	Vol XXVII	Guendell	OKH: Organization and Working System of the Army Quartermaster Department 1941 - 1945
P-041bb	B 12 e	Vol XXVIII	Erfurth	OKH: German Liaison General Attached to Finnish Army
P-041cc	B 12 f	Vol XXIX Ch I	Grimmeis	OKH Liaison Officers
	B 12 g	Ch II	Loytved-Hardegg	General of the Luftwaffe Attached to OKH
P-041dd ✓	B 13	Vol XXX	Koehler	Functions of Army Chief of Armaments: Organization, Working System and Possibilities from 193[illegible] 1945

P-041ee	B 14	Vol XXXI	Heinrichs	Army General Office
P-041ff	B 15	Vol XXXII	Leeb	Army Ordnance Office, 1938 - 1945
P-041gg	B 16	Vol XXXIII	Osterkamp	OKH Functions in Controlling ZI Sources of Supply for the Army: Organization, Expenditures Working System of Army Administration Office
P-041hh	B 17	Vol XXXIV	Kleikamp	Personnel Policy as an Instrument in Support of Command as Illustrated by the Functions and Facilities of Army Personnel Office, 1939 - 1945
P-041ii	B 18	Vol XXXV	Zeitzler	Commentaries
P-041jj	B 19	Vol XXXVI	Guderian	Commentaries

CONTENTS

		Page:
Preface by Generaloberst Franz Halder		1
Chapter I	: Arrangement of the Study, Sources	5
Chapter II	: Relations between the Army High Command and the Wehrmacht High Command	7
Chapter III	: Mobilization of the Army High Command	17
Chapter IV	: The Commander in Chief of the Army	20
Chapter V	: The Army Personnel Office	28
Chapter VI	: The Army General Staff	31
Chapter VII	: The Commander of the Replacement Training Army or the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army	43
Chapter VIII	: The General Army Office	48
Chapter IX	: The Army Ordnance Office	56
Chapter X	: The Army Administration Office	60
Chapter XI	: Other Agencies of the Army High Command which were immediately responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Army, to Hitler in his capacities of Fuehrer and Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, or to the Chief, Wehrmacht High Command	63
Chapter XII	: The Representation of the various Arms in the Army High Command	68
Appendix 1	: Service Regulations of the Inspector General of the Armored Troops	1

MS # P-041 a

Author

Hermann Burkhart MUELLER-HILLEBRAND
Generalmajor
Date of birth: 26 December 1904
Place of birth: Dieuze, Lorraine.

MUELLER-HILLEBRAND received training in the Ohrdruf Officer Candidate School in 1925, after having served since April 1923 in the 16th Cavalry Regiment, and later underwent further training at the Hannover Cavalry School, in 1925/26, and at the Berlin War College, in 1934/36.

Just after World War II broke out, on 15 September 1939, he was transferred from the Organization Division of Army General Staff to the 93rd Infantry Division as Operations Officer. On 1 October 1940 he was assigned as adjutant to the Chief of Army General Staff and in April 1942 was appointed Chief of the Organization Division of Army General Staff. In 1944, after two brief spells in the Army High Command Officer Reserve and an assignment as Commander of the 24th Panzer Regiment, MUELLER-HILLEBRAND was assigned as Chief of Staff to XXXVI Panzer Corps in the Ukraine and Poland, remaining in that position until transferred as Chief of Staff to the Third Panzer Army.

During the War he served in France, Italy and on the eastern front and was finally captured near Schwerin, Mecklenburg, on 2 May 1945.

RESTRICTED

PREFACE

The Army High Command was the top headquarters of the German Army. It was responsible for maintaining the Army in a state of preparedness and for directing the operations of the Army. It exercised no ministerial functions whatever. These rested for the entire Wehrmacht with the Wehrmacht High Command, which at the same time was the superior of the Army High Command in matters of military operations. The delimitation of the authority of these two high command headquarters had been the subject of an embittered struggle since the appointment of von Blomberg as Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht in addition to his function as Minister of War. The Army High Command maintained the view that for Germany, as a continental power, the Army was the decisive factor in national defense, and that its interests must be binding also for the other branches of the Wehrmacht. This demand was opposed by the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, who viewed it as an attempt to limit his authority and his responsibility toward the Government. In practice, this struggle, which naturally manifested itself in ambiguities and internal contradictions in the formal top-level organization of the Wehrmacht, was decided by political factors. In 1938, Hitler himself took over the post hitherto held by von Blomberg. As head of the state, leader of the National Socialist Party, and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht he faced the Army High Command with a crushing preponderance. His Party associate, Goering, exerted his whole political weight toward securing the leading role for

his Luftwaffe at the expense of the Army. In addition to the Army, the Waffen-SS evolved as a ground force, with its organization and training as well as its employment removed from the control of the Army High Command.

The limitation of the responsibilities of the Commander in Chief of the Army and the concurrent restriction of the functions of the Army High Command therefore must not be regarded as the mature product of a systematic development. The structure of the Army High Command must rather be regarded as the result -- adversely affected by political forces -- of a struggle, in which the Army fought with inadequate success to retain its traditional position and to fulfill its constitutional mission. It does not represent what could be considered in the light of experience of the German Army as the ideal organization for the top command agency of a continental army.

The deficiencies could have been overcome even during the War if the growing brutality of Hitler's dominating personality had not itself destroyed the command mechanism of the Army, which was still powerful by virtue of its uniform and solid management. The elimination of the Commander in Chief of the Army from all strategic deliberations and decisions connected with politics even before the War, was the beginning; Hitler's ever-increasing personal interference in the command authority of the Commander in Chief of the Army through oral commands, written directives, and even direct orders to agencies subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Army, and the establishment of Wehrmacht High Command theaters of operations commencing in Norway, were the continuation; the removal of the

Commander in Chief of the Army and assumption of his authority by Hitler himself was the climax of a development, which finally led to the extemporary improvisation of the dictator taking the place of a systematic command organization and to makeshift measures, dictated by the exigencies of the moment, replacing the clear principles of leadership.

If the Army High Command, as the top command agency of the Army, was able during the first years of the War to fulfill its operational mission with some measure of success in spite of this development, and even during the last years to remain the sole fixed point in the generally spreading command chaos, this is due solely to the selfless and self-sacrificing spirit of the officers and their assistants in the Army High Command as the inheritors and representatives of the best old German military tradition.

/s/ Franz Halder

The German Army High Command

A graphic presentation covering the period from 1938 to the end of World War II, with details on the organizational relations, the functions and the responsibilities of the various agencies within the Army High Command

by

Generalmajor Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand

Chapter I

Arrangement of the Study, Sources.

The organization of the Army High Command in the course of its development from 1938 to 1945 is presented in the charts attached as appendices 2 - 24. For the sake of clarity, the entire organization has been broken down into separate charts. Thus, the chart in appendix 2 shows those agencies which were immediately responsible to the Army High Command, without any details about their sub-division. The details are shown in separate charts in appendices 3 - 9. Wherever necessary, further remifications are given in supplementary charts 10 - 24, as will be seen from the table of contents.

Unfortunately the source material available for the elaboration was not complete. Additional information has been furnished from memory by the author and obtained through interrogation of numerous persons

The following sources were used:

1) The mobilization records of the Army High Command for 1939, which were almost completely available.

2) Numerous extracts from the Army general information bulletins and regulations published during the war.

3) The GERMAN HIGH COMMAND, a work compiled in 1945 by a group of American, British and Canadian authors. It must be noted that the GERMAN HIGH COMMAND contains numerous inaccuracies in the detailed information.

Nevertheless, this present work cannot be regarded as absolutely free of inaccuracies.

Chapter II

Relations between the Army High Command and the Wehrmacht High Command.

At the Head of the Army was the Commander in Chief of the Army. The Army High Command served as his staff, and was subdivided into several offices. Each office was under a chief and of these chiefs the Chief of the Army General Staff was the permanent deputy of the Commander in Chief of the Army.

The work and organization of the offices of the Army High Command developed both in peace and in war from the wartime mission of the Army. Broadly speaking, the missions of the Commander in Chief of the Army were as follows:

Organization and command of the Army.

Education and training of the troops and their officers.

Procurement of all requirements in man power, horses, motor and other vehicles, equipment, clothing, food, and of the funds necessary to this end.

Development and procurement of arms, ammunition and all types of military equipment.

Construction of national fortifications.

Administration of stocks and landed property.

The Commander in Chief of the Army was responsible to the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, whose military staff was the Wehrmacht High Command. Thus, the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Army was

responsible to the Fuehrer and Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht by no means implied that the Army High Command was subordinate to the Wehrmacht High Command. See appendix 2.

The Commander in Chief of the Army, as well as the Commanders in Chief of the other branches of the armed forces had very extensive missions so that only a relatively minor mission remained for the Wehrmacht High Command, that of arbitrating in all fields in which the interests of the separate branches of the armed forces overlapped or clashed, or of advising the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht on the decisions to be made.

The question of whether each of the three branches of the armed forces should have a commander in chief or not, and if so, what missions should be assigned to them, had been a point of dissention since 1933. The Commander in Chief of the Army argued that, in accordance with tradition and in view of the real significance of the Army, he should be given a large measure of independence within an armed force organized for continental missions. The main argument against this view came from the Chief, Wehrmacht High Command, who demanded a firmer and more centralized control of the individual branches and the restriction of the responsibilities of the Commander in Chief of the Army. The initial decision was in favor of the Commander in Chief of the Army, but the controversy continued. It had to do almost exclusively with Wehrmacht High Command - Army High Command relations, whereas the positions held by the Commanders in Chief of the Luftwaffe and of the Navy were generally not contested by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command. Political circumstances had rendered the position of Goering unassailable for

the Chief, Wehrmacht High Command, and the Commander in Chief of the Navy was not in the limelight in Germany, a continental power.

Added to the existing difference of opinion described above was the personal antagonism between the Commander in Chief of the Army, Freiherr von Fritsch, later von Brauchitsch, and Hitler, which created an atmosphere of distrust. Under these circumstances the problem of the position of the Commander in Chief of the Army and the contingent problem of the position of the Army High Command in relation to the Wehrmacht High Command never came to rest. In time, actual development led to the solution that had originally been rejected. However, this development did not come about organically, naturally; numerous functions of the Army High Command were gradually taken over by the Wehrmacht High Command without any fuss, opposing personnel of the Army High Command being removed in the process. This resulted in strained relations and organizational deficiencies and flaws, which often very harmfully influenced the course of events during the war. Development within the Army High Command also did not remain for long unaffected by these circumstances, as will continuously be observed in the following chapters.

Some of the chief stages in the course of developments, during which essential functions were taken away from the Commander in Chief of the Army and thereby from the Army High Command, and assigned to the Wehrmacht High Command are the following:

a) Conduct of operations in Denmark and Norway by the Wehrmacht High Command in April 1940.

b) Separation of Wehrmacht High Command and Army High Command theaters of war in 1941.

c) The removal of the Commander in Chief of the Army.

By the end of the war the transfer of Army High Command functions to the Wehrmacht High Command was almost completed. Whether it was logically justified or not, the fact that it took the form of a fight for power behind the scenes had serious repercussions on the military course of the war. The development of this centralized organization has its counterpart in the centralized organization of the entire machinery of the State at the time under review.

In their composition the Wehrmacht High Command, and within it the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, were not equal to the steadily growing responsibilities, because the development was not carried through systematically and organically but took place in the form of a disrupting struggle for power or as a result of the personal capriciousness of Hitler. Measures to reorganize and expand the Wehrmacht High Command therefore were often behind the times.

When the invasion of Europe by the Western Allies started in 1944, the theaters of war of the Army High Command and those of the Wehrmacht High Command balanced each other in importance. In this way the Wehrmacht High Command with its Wehrmacht Operations Staff on the one hand, and the Army High Command with its Army General Staff on the other, became in practice two operations staffs of equal rank with rival interests. Both were under one and the same supreme commander, Hitler, but the Wehrmacht

High Command was supposed to handle problems of the over-all conduct of the War — without having the necessary organization at its disposal, while the Army High Command had that part of the organization which the Wehrmacht High Command lacked, but was restricted in its command missions to one segment. Under these circumstances Hitler's Wehrmacht High Command Staff was bound to lose its mental grasp of the over-all conduct of war and the power to draw unbiased conclusions. Only Hitler himself could have brought about a reconciliation of the two rival staffs. The Army High Command had been reduced from the commanding position in the military sphere which it had still held in 1937, to a field command headquarters of the Russo-German battle front. The process had been a gradual one up to 1941, but from then on had been rapid.

Being the dominating branch of the armed forces the Army had initially retained numerous functions in which it acted jointly for the other branches. Thus, until 1944:

all man power problems of the entire armed forces were handled by an Army High Command agency, which, in such matters, was responsible directly to the Wehrmacht High Command;

the Chief of Army Transportation was at the same time Chief of Wehrmacht Transportation — but exercised these functions at the headquarters of the Army High Command, without having a special staff for his Wehrmacht mission;

the Chief Army Signal Officer was in a position similar to that of the Chief of Army Transportation, the only difference being that

he had a Wehrmacht Signal Group at his disposal at the Wehrmacht High Command to handle his mission as Chief Wehrmacht Signal Officer;

the same situation prevailed in certain fields of the armament, supply, administration, mapping and survey, medical, and veterinary services.

The duality of command also extended to lower levels. For instance, the commanding generals were subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Army. However, in the zone of the interior, they were at the same time Wehrkreis * commanders and as such were directly subordinate to Hitler. The armament inspectorates were responsible to the Wehrmacht High Command, but in certain matters they received directives from the Army Ordnance Office.

This lack of clear-cut authority in the organization led to many points of friction, which for the time being could be surmounted without great difficulty. But after Hitler assumed the post of Commander in Chief of the Army in December 1941, the complexity and confusion mounted steadily. This will be seen in a comparison of appendices 2, 3, 4 and 5 which contrast the chains of command in respect to certain important subjects at various times between 1939 and 1943. It is not possible to present all the intricacies, which were due on the one hand to the above-mentioned endeavors of the Wehrmacht High Command to exchange its

---

* The basic military area of Germany, resembling the pre-War United States Corps Area.

coordinating functions for the functions of an actual operations staff of the armed forces and on the other hand to the personality of Hitler and the reverses suffered at the fronts. By interfering with the organization, Hitler succeeded in bringing about recklessly massed forces for certain short-lived purposes, but in doing so brought about a steady deterioration of the armament system, the control of personnel and the striking power of the troops. His measures were often dictated by innerpolitical intentions. Clear-cut organization was in an increasing measure replaced by extemporizations to meet the exigencies of the moment.

The steps leading to these symptoms of disorganization were almost always taken by other than Army agencies, if not by Hitler himself. A few of the measures which had the effects described above are given as follows:

a) In 1941 the Commander in Chief of the Army was deprived of his command authority over parts of the Army through the creation of Wehrmacht High Command theaters of war. The forces involved were commanded by the Wehrmacht High Command but supplied, organized, and so forth, by the Army High Command. In view of the confined areas involved, however, command, organization, supply, and so forth, were interdependent, so that a separation of these functions was senseless.

b) The units of the Waffen-SS were tactically employed by the army. But although the units fought closely intermingled with units of the Army, they were not placed under Army command in respect to supplies or disciplinary and legal matters. This led to considerable friction

between the higher levels of command of the Army and those of the Waffen - SS.

c) Under orders from Hitler the Luftwaffe in the autumn of 1942 activated ground combat units, the Luftwaffe field divisions, in large numbers. Similarly to the Waffen - SS units, these were placed under the command of the Army for tactical purposes only *, with the natural result that most of them could never become fully efficient ground forces.

d) In March 1940 part of the control over the production of arms, equipment and ammunition was taken from the Army High Command and transferred to the civilian Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition, in which ministry the Army High Command had no influence. This interference increased in 1943, when armament factories belonging to the Army but operating under license were put under the control of the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production **. Finally, the Army Ordnance Office was taken from the Army in 1945 and changed into the Wehrmacht Ordnance Office.

It may be argued that the success of an organization does not depend on dogmatic considerations, but on the strength of the leading personalities concerned, who ignore the bureaucratic formalities anyhow. This argument is only partly correct, because certain reasonable standards must be maintained for any organization. In the end such standards were

---

* About one year later these units were transferred to the Army, as, in spite of the great willingness of the soldiers, most of them had never had the opportunity to become fully efficient combat units.

** Formerly Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition.

no longer maintained and as a logical consequence dissolution of organizational structure had to follow sooner or later. Contrary to the above examples, the procedure actually adopted often led to outstanding accomplishments for a certain time and in a given direction in isolated cases, but these accomplishments had to be paid for by heavy reverses in other fields, as is shown in the following example:

At the beginning of 1942 the Army's share of the industrial output in armaments was considerably increased on orders from Hitler, following an order issued by him in autumn 1941 without consulting the Commander in Chief of the Army to throttle production for the Army in favor of the Luftwaffe and the Navy.

In some lines, such as tanks and other arms, an output figure was now reached which was relatively high in comparison with former productions. For this purpose large numbers of able-bodied men were assigned to the armament industry in 1942, instead of being drafted into the Army as replacements for the intended operations in accordance with existing plans. In view of the heavy losses in the winter of 1941/42 this withdrawal of personnel was in direct contradiction to the operational objectives, Stalingrad and the Caucasus, ordered by Hitler for the year 1942. Hitler remained deaf to all demands of the Army High Command that it be allocated the necessary supply of man power, but at the same time insisted on his operational aims. The collapse of the armies on both sides of Stalingrad must to a considerable degree be attributed to the fact that the losses it had sustained during the summer could only be inadequately replaced. The defeat suffered at the front more than outbalanced

the increased armament production.

Chapter III

Mobilization of the Army High Command.

The railroad, and later the motor, had narrowed down spaces during the past century and had drawn the countries of continental Europe closer together. From the defense point of view, the result for these countries was that the transition from a state of peace to a state of war became a particularly critical factor. The country that could complete this transition fastest, could gain a military advantage over its neighbor, before that country could have its forces ready for action, and, thus, if favored by the fortune of war, could decisively weaken the enemy shortly after the start of the war and thereby win final victory. These circumstances had resulted in the continental powers paying particular attention since the middle of the 19th Century to the problem of rapid preparation for war. The transition, or mobilization, and the following concentration of the forces were prepared in peace according to carefully elaborated plans and went off like clockwork when the appropriate command was given. With frontiers near to its important industrial areas in the Saar and Ruhr regions and in Upper-Silesia and Saxony, Germany in particular was forced to expedite mobilization to the utmost for the protection of those vital districts .

Since the missions of the Army High Command also changed with the start of war, with new functions arising and with other functions increasing or decreasing in importance, plans for the mobilization of the

Army High Command had to be prepared. When mobilization was ordered at the end of August 1939, the structure of the Army High Command underwent immediate changes in the following respects:

a) The Army High Command was divided into a field headquarters, outside of Berlin, and a rear headquarters consisting of all those elements not in the field headquarters and which remained in Berlin. The field headquarters, where the Commander in Chief was located and which was called "Headquarters, Army High Command" (Hq OKH) comprised the elements necessary for the conduct of operations and control of the supply services of the Field Army (see appendix 6). At Berlin a Commander of the Replacement Training Army was appointed, who was responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Army, and was in command of all those elements of the Army High Command which were necessary for the command, training, and so forth, of the Replacement Training Army, for the direction of armament supplies, the registration and procurement of man power and material in the zone of interior and other missions. In addition, certain other headquarters elements of the Army High Command which were not considered essential remained at Berlin. These measures were caused by the endeavor to keep the headquarters of the Army High Command as small and mobile as possible.

b) The above division and the changing mission at the start of the War caused a change in the structure of many agencies of the Army High Command, especially of the Army General Staff, in addition to the establishment of new and the dissolution of existing agencies, as will

be seen from the following chapters and from the charts attached as appendices. On most of the charts the time of mobilization has been specially marked.

Immediately upon mobilization the field headquarters of the Army High Command was transferred from Berlin to Zossen/Waensdorf, about 50 kilometers south-east of Berlin. There, a modern central command headquarters had been constructed in the barracks of the local troop training camp, which was not quite complete when the war began. Besides Zossen, the troop training camp at Ohrdruf, about 20 kilometers south of Gotha in Thuringia, had been prepared to accommodate the field headquarters of the Army High Command but without the special constructions set up at Zossen. The premises at Ohrdruf were not used. The headquarters of the Army High Command, which should not be confused with Hitler's Headquarters, changed its location several times during the war. From its first location it was transferred in May 1940, at the start of the western campaign, to the Eifel, certain elements being detached and sent to Godesberg on the Rhine and to Giessen. Later during this campaign headquarters shifted to Belgium and finally to Fontainebleau. On 1 November 1940 it returned to Zossen, and then, after a brief spell with a reduced staff at Wiener-Neustadt in April 1941, it was transferred with the start of the Russian Campaign into a newly constructed site in the Mauer forest near Angerburg in East-Prussia. Early in July, 1942, it was shifted to Winnitza in Ukraine, from where it returned to East-Prussia in November 1942, where it remained until returned to Zossen again at the end of 1944.

Chapter IV

The Commander in Chief of the Army.

(Explanations to appendix 2)

From appendix 2 it will be clearly perceived that three events occured during the war which had a marked influence on the position of the Commander in Chief of the Army, namely

a) the mobilization at the start of the war,

b) the dismissal of Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch on 19 December 1941 with its after-effects which lasted until autumn 1942,

c) the attempted assessination of Hitler on 20 July 1944.

The reorganization of the Army High Command in connection with the mobilization has been dealt with in the preceding chapter. The three offices of the Army High Command remaining at Berlin, namely, the General Army Office, the Army Ordnance Office, and the Army Administration Office, were placed under the command of the newly created Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of the Replacement Training Army * in order to relieve the burden on the Commander in Chief of the Army in favor of his strategic missions. In like manner, the arms and services inspectorates,

---

* Only a "Commander of the Replacement Training Army" had been provided for in the Mobilization Plan. This post was held by General von Stuelpnagel, who had already been retired. After a few days he was replaced by General Fromm on orders from Hitler. After this replacement the post was appropriately designated Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of the Replacement Training Army. If either of the terms "Chief of Army Armaments" or "Commander of the Replacement Training Army" is encountered in every-day speech or writing, as is often the case, it must be understood that one and the same agency is meant.

which had been under the Commander in Chief until mobilization, were now also placed under the Commander of the Replacement Training Army. Their position within the Army High Command will be discussed later. The Judge Advocate Branch was dealt with in the same way. Finally, the post of Chief of Mobile Troops, created in autumn 1938, was abolished at the mobilization. This agency is discussed in chapter XII. After the mobilization the only agencies directly responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Army besides the Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of the Replacement Training Army, were the Chief of the Army Personnel Office and the Chief of the Army General Staff.

This organization was not adapted to a war lasting as long as World War II actually did, and therefore required supplementation as the War expanded and drew on. Apart from the above-mentioned purpose of relieving the burden on the Commander in Chief of the Army, the obvious intention was to have all military problems solved by the strategic command. The Chief of the Army General Staff had the mission of directing the operations of the Army. In all other matters, such as organization, supplies, replacement of man power, armaments, development of arms and equipment, he placed the requisitions resulting from the requirements of the strategic command. In the Army General Staff there were appropriate organs, which represented the demands made by the Chief of the Army General Staff in relations with the other elements of the Army High Command.

A result of the Polish campaign and of the expansion of the War following the declaration of war by the Western Powers, was that the

Commander in Chief of the Army realized that, apart from his mission of strategic command, it was becoming increasingly necessary for him to deal with matters which he had believed he could leave to the Chief of the Army Armaments and Commander of the Replacement Training Army and other agencies. Problems connected with discipline and troop welfare *, and friction with the National Socialist Party and the Waffen - SS as early as September 1939 had led to the creation of the Office for Army Affairs within the Army General Staff, which office was at the disposal of the Commander in Chief for such questions. After the campaign in France this office became insufficient. On 1 October 1940 the Commander in Chief of the Army appointed a "General Acting as Special Assistant to the Commander in Chief of the Army" who was at his personal disposal and could deal with these matters as they came up. **

The dismissal of Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch on 19 December 1941 changed the situation decisively in consequence of the abolishment of the post of Commander in Chief of the Army.

Hitler himself assumed command, and to serve him in this capacity, made the Chief of the Army General Staff directly responsible to him. All other responsibilities of the Commander in Chief of the Army were transferred to Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, to whom the Army Personnel

---

* Upon mobilization, the peacetime strength of the army 734 000, had increased to 3 750 000, of which 2 000 000 had received no military training since 1918. Unforeseen problems of discipline and education resulted.

** For particulars on the activities of a General acting as special assistant see explanations in chapter XI.

Office, the Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of the Replacement Training Army, and the General acting as special assistant were subordinated. Theoretically this seemed to be a simplification of command channels and even a close approach to what many considered the ideal solution, namely, the concentration of the function of Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht and of the Commander in Chief of the Army in the hands of one man. In practice, however, it proved an intolerable hindrance in the command of the army, for from now on to the end of the War the command remained shackled by the necessity to obtain Hitler's personal decision even in matters of the most minor importance. As a military layman and because of his suspicious distrust, Hitler was not prepared to grant the Chief of the Army General Staff and the highest troop commanders the widest possible scope in the assignment of missions, which is the basic condition for a successful command in any armed force. On the other hand it was not possible to submit to and discuss with the head of the State -- who was already burdened with other responsibilities -- all those problems which had been submitted to and discussed with the Commander in Chief of the Army or to keep him as fully informed on all matters. It must be added that from the day he assumed command over the Army Hitler almost never visited the various field headquarters or the troops. As a result the practice was started of summoning commanders from the front to conferences at Hitler's Headquarters, a practice which was contrary to all military experience.

This led not only to interference in the smallest details of tactical command but also to Hitler becoming increasingly estranged to and ignorant of the actual life and requirements of the troops, the various command headquarters and the agencies of the Army High Command.

In addition to his already numerous responsibilities as Chief, Wehrmacht High Command, Generalfeldmarschall Keitel was not able to exercise adequately the new authority vested in him and formerly vested in the Commander in Chief of the Army. The moral influence formerly exercised by the Commander in Chief of the Army on the officer corps and on the troops was lost and confidence disappeared. From now on the influence of education and example were displaced in ever growing measure by threats and propaganda, a development which found its visible expression within the organization of the Army two years later in the establishment of the National Socialist Guidance Corps. The removal of Generaloberst Halder as Chief of the Army General Staff in September 1942 and the appointment of a new Chief of the Army Personnel Office at the same time were also steps in the same direction.

Until abolished in March 1944 the Adjutant's office of the Commander in Chief of the Army was at the disposal of Generalfeldmarschall Keitel. On 15 January 1942, an agency designated Chief of Army Staff with Chief, Wehrmacht High Command was established and attached to the headquarters of the Chief, Wehrmacht High Command. * Officers formerly employed in

---

* Not shown on the charts because it was an agency of the Wehrmacht High Command.

the Army High Command were assigned to this new staff. They were to assist and advise the Chief, Wehrmacht High Command in his new duties arising from the responsibilities transferred from the Commander in Chief of the Army -- the subordination of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army to him -- and to maintain the existing close contact with the Army General Staff. The Chief of the Army Staff was very soon made use of by Hitler to carry through his intentions in the fields of organization and armaments.

In 1943, shortly after the defeat at Stalingrad, the post of "Inspector General of Armored Troops" was created by order of Hitler to press the drive for the improvement and expansion of the armored forces. The powers granted this agency serve as an example of how the structure of the organization was recklessly destroyed to set free all energies in pursuit of one specific aim. The fact that other matters would be unfavorably affected to the detriment of the strategic command, was ignored or accepted as unavoidable. The Inspector General of the Armored Troops was not placed under the Chief of the Army General Staff. His missions and authority are described in chapter XII and appendices 1 and 5.

After the 20 July 1944 the post of Chief of the Army General Staff and that of Inspector General of the Armored Troops were held by one man, which to a certain extent ameliorated the disorganization that had been caused in the Army High Command by the direct subordination of a specific arm to Hitler. The position of the Inspector General of the Armored Troops is also characteristic for the change that had taken place

in relations between the Army High Command -- especially the Chief of the Army General Staff -- and the Wehrmacht High Command in favor of the latter. When doing away with the Commander in Chief of the Army the logical conclusion had not been drawn to unite the Army High Command, as a staff, with, or to place it under, the Wehrmacht High Command. Instead, only a half-measure had been taken. A union of the two staffs, or the subordination of one to the other, naturally would have had far-reaching consequences in their organization and personnel.

On 22 December 1943 the post of Chief of the National Socialist Guidance Staff was formed as top level command in the Army for the new National Socialist Guidance Organization, which had its organs in all staffs and units. The Chief of the National Socialist Guidance Staff in the Army was immediately responsible to Hitler, as was the case with the Chief of the National Socialist Guidance Staff for the Wehrmacht.

The 20 July 1944 resulted in a change of personnel in all essential posts. Himmler, the Commander in Chief of the SS now took over the post of Commander of the Replacement Training Army as Commander in Chief of the Replacement Training Army and appointed SS Obergruppenfuehrer * Juettner as his deputy. When the Army Ordnance Office was transferred to the Wehrmacht High Command at the end of 1944, the post of Chief of Army Armaments was abolished.

The development of the organization of the Army High Command during the War, as described, shows that the principle of giving the strategic

---

* Equivalent rank in the US Army - lieutenant general.

command priority over all other military problems, was abandoned after the Army no longer had its own, separate commander in chief. The manifold changes in many other agencies of the Army High Command, which will be dealt with later, corresponded to this development.

Chapter V

The Army Personnel Office.

(Explanations to appendix 8)

The Chief of the Army Personnel Office originally was responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Army, then, after December 1941, to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, and finally, after the autumn of 1943 directly to Hitler. The Army Personnel Office handled all officer personnel affairs such as rating, promotion regulations, transfers, affairs of discipline and honor, decorations. Beyond that it determined the requirements in officers and officer candidates in cooperation with the appropriate agencies of the Army High Command. *

At the beginning of the War the Chief of the Army Personnel Office had moved with a small staff to the Field Headquarters of the Army High Command. The major part of the office had remained at Berlin unchanged, but its expansion soon became necessary as may be seen from appendix 8, in which the functions of the individual divisions of the office have been indicated in the "Remarks" column. The various sections of Branch 1, which sections were upgraded to branches when the branch was expanded to a group, had handled the files of officers separately according to specific arms. Thus, Branch 3 handled the files of officers on the supplementary

---

* Organizational Branch of the Army General Staff, Arms and Services Branch of the General Army Office. The latter was later redesignated Inspector General for Potential Officers.

list (E Offiziere) until the designation "E Offiziere" * was abolished. When General Schmundt became Chief of the Army Personnel Office in October 1942, he appointed a deputy Chief of the Army Personnel Office, since he himself was very fully occupied with his responsibilities as Chief Wehrmacht Adjutant to the Fuehrer, which post he retained. The Chief of the Army Personnel Office was attached to Hitler's headquarters, but the Deputy Chief was with the field headquarters of the Army High Command, together with liaison staffs of the various sections and groups of the office. The bulk of the office remained at or near Berlin.

The inclusion of certain government official careers in the newly formed Corps of Specialized Career Officers (motor transport troops officers) and among the officers in the specialized services (administration officers, Wehrmacht judges, officers in the technical services) led to the establishment of Branch 6 (after 1 April 1943 Group 6) of the Army Personnel Office, which also handled the files of all medical and veterinary officer personnel, the ordnance staff officers and of the various specialist personnel in the officer posts. **

---

* The designation "E Offizier" had been introduced with the expansion of the Army. The large demand for officers made it necessary to employ in staffs, officers who were no longer fit for the normal career of troop officers, usually owing to their state of health or their age. These officers were generally assigned to the agencies handling replacement affairs and to agencies of the Army High Command.

** As there was a lack of reserve officers at the beginning of the War, the emergency measure was adopted of appointing persons without military training but having the necessary professional knowledge in specialist posts which should have been filled by officers according to the Table of Organization. These persons were not officers but specialists in officer posts.

Of fundamental importance was the fact that the Army Personnel Officer took over the handling of the files of the General Staff Corps officers. This important task had hitherto been the responsibility of the Chief of the Army General Staff, because he was responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Army for the entire General Staff service, including the training and appointment of General Staff officers. With the dismissal of Generaloberst Halder in September 1942 this arrangement was changed by order of Hitler. Those parts of the Central Branch of the Army General Staff which handled the General Staff officer affairs were transferred to the Army Personnel Office as Branch 3. In the service regulations it was stipulated only that the Chief of the General Staff of the Army was to assist in the appointment of General Staff officers.

Chapter VI

The Army General Staff.

(Explanations to appendix 9)

The Army General Staff was responsible in peace for operational planning; in war, it was responsible for the planning and conduct of Army operations. The Chief of the Army General Staff was the first assistant and the permanent deputy of the Commander in Chief of the Army. He supervised the conduct of operations according to directives from the Commander in Chief of the Army. For particulars on the chain of command see appendices 2 - 5. The Chief of the Army General Staff took precedence over all other chiefs of offices within the Army and was to be kept informed by them on all important matters in their spheres of activity, so that he was in a position to give his opinion on all matters to the Commander in Chief of the Army. Furthermore, the Chief of the Army General Staff required of the other agencies of the Army High Command all services which he deemed necessary in the execution of his command mission. In this way the principle was maintained that the problems of strategic command should always decisively influence all other provinces.

The organization of the Army General Staff had to be such that it met all requirements of the comprehensive mission described above. Because the work of the Army General Staff changed at the mobilization from planning to the execution of plans, a far-reaching reorganization

and expansion was a logical result. *

With the beginning of the War the Army General Staff assumed responsibility for the operations and the supply of the Field Army. However, this Field Army was several times larger than the peace army and, furthermore, at the start of the War this enlarged army moved from its permanent garrisons to the field for mobile action. From what has been said about mobilization in chapter III, it may be deduced that at the beginning of the War the command had no time to adapt itself to the situation. From the first day command and supply had to function with the greatest degree of efficiency in order not to jeopardize the success of the first important operations.

Appendix 9 will show that already before the War, in November 1938, a considerable reorganization of the Army General Staff had taken place. It was brought about by the new Chief of the Army General Staff, General der Artillerie Halder, and corresponded to the enlarged tasks of the General Staff caused by the enlargement of the Army during this time. ** The Deputy Chiefs I to V of the General Staff *** had been appointed to unburden the Chief of the Army General Staff and to secure the integration of various groupings of branches in certain fields. The deputies

---

* For the sake of clarity, particulars are given on two organizational charts, appendices 9 and 10; appendix 9 shows the transition from the peacetime to the wartime organization, appendix 10 takes the organization existing on 1 January 1940 as its starting point.

** The reconstruction of the Army on the basis of conscription had not come to a close yet at the start of the War.

*** The "Deputy Chief of the General Staff" had nothing to do with the supply and administration services of field forces. The designation "Oberquartiermeister" had been chosen for traditional reasons alone.

had no authority to make independent decisions and their appointment made no change in the responsibility of the branch chiefs to the Chief of the Army General Staff. In practise it became customary for Deputies IV and V, whose fields of activity were clearly circumscribed, to exercise in wide measure the deciding authority of the Chief of the Army General Staff within their branches. Whereas in peace the branches were designated by numbers (1 to 12), they were given new designations according to their responsibilities upon mobilization, for instance, Operation Branch.

The Central Branch (GZ) handled the files of all General Staff officers, appointments, promotions and so forth; furthermore it regulated the routine of the Army General Staff, controlled the courier service, and during the War appointed the Headquarters Commandant at Army High Command Headquarters, who, though responsible to the Chief of the Army General Staff generally received the commands of the Chief of the Army General Staff through the Central Branch.

In peace all those departments had been combined under the First Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, which, in the more closely defined sense of the word, were required in the direction of operations, namely, the Operations, Transportation, Supply, Survey and Mapping, and the Fortifications Branches. During the war the First Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff was at the disposal of the Chief of the Army General Staff for special assignments until his post was abolished in 1943. In autumn 1944 a similar agency was established, under a Chief of the Command Group, which directly controlled the Operations and the

Organizational Branches as well as the Branch for Foreign Armies-East. At the same time the Chief of the Command Group was Deputy of the Chief of the Army General Staff. With the beginning of the War the above-mentioned branches naturally enlarged their activity considerably, as may be gathered from appendix 9, and from the following enumeration of their peace and wartime activities:

1) Operational Branch.

a) In peace: Operational planning and studies; preparatory work for the operational organization of the Field Army and of the protective concentration.

b) In war: Strategic command and the issue of operational directives.

2) Transportation Branch.

a) In peace: Preparatory work for transportation during mobilization and concentration; preparations to secure fulfillment of the transportation requirements of the General Staff within the armed forces and in negotiations with the higher civilian transportation authorities; development and organization of the military transportation system against the eventuality of war.

b) In war: (Chief of the Transportation). Control of transportation for all operations and other purposes of the armed forces; development and control of the traffic services in occupied territories; procurement of the services and facilities required by the Army General Staff from the traffic system within the armed forces and in

relations with the upper government authorities.

3) Supply Branch (designated Quartermaster General during the War).

a) In peace: Preparations to regulate the supplies of the Army during war. Preparation of appropriate stipulations for the organization of the supply services, stock piling and production quotas for supply commodities during the war. Collaboration in the preparation of operational studies, supply problems in tactical rides for commanders and General Staffs officers; the study of problems arising in the zone of operations, in civil administration, and in connection with evacuations. The preparation of regulations.

b) In war: The supply service of the Field Army; military administration of occupied territories.

4) Mapping and Survey Branch.

a) In peace: Preparation of maps and other geographical data for use in war; surveying for national defense purposes.

b) In war: Supply of maps to the troops; improvement of available geographical data.

The National Fortifications Branch * was dissolved in 1939. Its responsibilities were taken over by the Operations Branch, the Branch for Foreign Armies and the Fortifications Inspectorate in the General Army Office, until the course taken by the War made its reestablishment necessary in 1944.

---

* In the mobilization records of the Army General Staff the department National Fortifications Branch has been entered. That is a mistake. The branch was actually established at the mobilization, but was dissolved immediately.

The handling of training problems was the responsibility of the Troop Training Branch (Branch 4) and of the Officer Training Branch (Branch 11).

In peacetime, the Troop Training Branch prepared the guiding principles for the training of troops, particularly the schedules and problems for training on the troop training grounds and for the major autumn maneuvers, as well as the regulations for training in combined arms action. Beyond that it influenced the training of the individual arms, as far as this was necessary to guarantee uniformity of training. The Officer Training Branch handled the training of officers. It issued directives for the tactical training of the line officers (map maneuvers and war games, tactical walks and rides, training courses, problems for studies to be written in winter). It was particularly responsible for the training of the officers earmarked for service in the General Staff (setting of problems for exams, training principles for the War Academy, advanced training of the General Staff officers). The strategic training of General Staff officers in posts as chiefs of staffs (setting of problems and the so-called chiefs of staffs rides) was the task of the Operational Branch.

Questions of organization were handled by the Organizational Branch (Branch 2), the responsibilities of which were as follows:

a) In peace: The wartime top level command organization; organization of the Army (establishment of unit tables of organization); mobilization (determining the size and the organization of the Army in time of war, mobilization directives); requirements of the Army General

Staff on other offices of the Army High Command in respect to armaments, development of arms and equipment, and so forth.

b) In war: Tables of organization for units in the Field Army; distribution of replacements for the field forces; guiding principles for the rehabilitation of units. Furthermore, the Organizational Branch handled the demands of the Chief of the Army General Staff in relations with the Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of the Replacement Training Army in respect to new unit activations, replacement of personnel, rehabilitation, equipment, as well as the fundamental requirements regarding the development and production of arms.

It had been the responsibility of Branch 8 (Technical Branch) to observe all developments of the military techniques, to keep the Chief of the Army General Staff informed about such developments, and to stimulate and prompt the appropriate agencies, especially the Army Ordnance Office. Branch 8 was dissolved at the mobilization.

The branches under the Assistant Chief of the General Staff IV (Intelligence) had the mission of evaluating all information on foreign armies as a basis for the operational command. The Attaché Section had been enlarged to a branch around the end of 1939. It handled all matters connected with the military attaché service; the attachés were controlled directly by the Chief of the Army General Staff up to 1944, after which the Attaché Branch was transferred to the Wehrmacht. The creation of the Army Affairs Office has been dealt with on page 21-22. It was separated from the Army General Staff in the spring of 1942 and transferred

to the Commander in Chief of the Army.

The post of Chief of Army Supply and Administration * had developed from Branch 6 (Supply). He controlled and supervised the supplies for the entire Field Army under instructions from the Chief of the Army General Staff and occupied a special position in the Army General Staff, not only because of the large size of his office, but also because his vast field of activity was closely interwoven with almost all agencies of the Army General Staff and with numerous agencies of the Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of the Replacement Training Army, as well as other agencies outside of the Army General Staff.

Posts which were newly created at the mobilization were the Army Chief Signal Officer, the General of the Luftwaffe attached to the Commander in Chief of the Army, and the Chief of Weather Service (Army). The post of Army Chief Signal Officer originated from the Signal Branch, Inspectorate 7, of the General Army Office. The Inspector of the Signal Corps became Army Chief Signal Officer, and his place on the Staff of the Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of the Replacement Training Army was taken by a new Inspector of the Signal Corps.

The Army Chief Signal Officer had the following missions:

a) Employment of all means of signal communication in the Field Army in accordance with the intentions of the command.

b) Maintenance of all signal communications between the Army High Command and the command headquarters it controlled, especially the army groups, for which purpose the Chief Signal Officer employed the

* Generalquartiermeister.

signal regiment assigned to him, and later the Command Signal Corps, which finally consisted of eight regiments.

c) Procurement of information on the enemy, so far as this could be obtained by radio or wire.

d) In addition, he was the senior officer of the entire signal corps. The Army Chief Signal Officer was at the same time Wehrmacht Chief Signal Officer, and in this capacity was responsible directly to the Wehrmacht High Command and had a branch, the Wehrmacht Signal Communication Branch, which was later upgraded to a group, in the Wehrmacht High Command.

This group handled the administrative work of the signal communications services for the three branches of the Wehrmacht, as well as cooperation with civilian stations, utilization of the network of the German postal service, control of the radio communication service of all authorized stations, cryptography and evaluation of the diplomatic radio communication service. In his capacity of Commissioner for Technical Means of Signal Communications, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Signal Communication from 1940 on supervised and regulated the development, requirements and distribution of signal equipment not only for the branches of the armed forces, but also for all other user agencies as, for instance, the post office, railroads, Waffen - SS.

Details will be given regarding the General of the Air Forces attached to the Commander in Chief of the Army in chapter XII, where the chiefs of arms and services are dealt with.

The Chief of the Army Weather Service had to keep the command informed on the weather forecasts.

The chiefs of arms and services attached to the Commander in Chief of the Army were established during the first months of the war. Details will be given later, in chapter XII.

In 1942 the following essential changes took place: In September, the Chief of the Army General Staff, Generaloberst Halder, was removed from his post by Hitler. At the same time the handling of the personnel files of officers of the General Staff Corps was transferred from the Army General Staff to the Army Personnel Office. The Central Branch was thereby taken over by the Army Personnel Office as Army Personnel Branch 3, leaving behind under the old designation those parts which handled the routine duties in the Army General Staff, the courier service, headquarters security, and so forth. The departments of the Assistant Chiefs of the General Staff I and IV were dissolved. In the spring of 1942 the Army Affairs Branch was transferred to the General acting as special assistant; its tasks will be explained when dealing with this general in chapter XI. In April 1942, the office of the Assistant Chief of the Army General Staff V was dissolved, and soon afterwards the Military Science Branch was transferred to the Wehrmacht High Command. In April 1942 General Scherff of the Wehrmacht High Command had been appointed by Hitler "Commissioner of the Fuehrer for Writing the History of this War" and the Military Science Branch of the Army General Staff had been subordinated to him as the Army Historical Branch. The installations

and offices formerly under the Assistant Chief of the Army General Staff V, which were controlled by the Army General Staff, were removed from the Army General Staff and placed under the "Commissioner of the Fuehrer". They were

The Army Historical Branch
The Chief of the Army Archives
The Chief of the Army Libraries
The Editorial Office of the MILITARY SCIENCE REVIEW

In this way the work of research in military history had been taken from the Army and transferred to the realm of politics, whereby an important basis for the education of potential officers had been lost.

In 1944 the attempt to assassinate Hitler on 20 July brought changes in the personnel of the Army General Staff, including a new Chief of Staff, as well as the establishment of several new agencies, which can be seen from the chart. The transfer of the Attaché Branch to the Wehrmacht High Command corresponded to the changed position of the Chief of the Army General Staff.

The development of those agencies serving under the Chief of Army Transportation and of those under the Chief of Army Supply and Administration, both of whom were at the head of extensive offices, can be seen from appendices 11 and 12, which are supplementary charts to appendices 9 and 10. The reader is also referred to the separate studies on these agencies. At the beginning of 1940 the office of the Chief of Army Transportation was reorganized in the light of experience gained and as a

result of the expansion of the War.

In 1942 the department of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration also was reorganized in line with experience gained and owing to the severely felt shortages in many fields. Section Qu 1 (Supply Planning and Organization) and Section Qu 3 (Processing of Supply Requisitions) were expanded to branches to control the supply services and handle materiel supplies.

The Chiefs of Arms and Services have been entered on appendix 13, a supplementary chart to appendices 8 and 9. Their functions will be described in chapter XII.

Chapter VII

The Commander of the Replacement Training Army or the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army.

(Explanations to Appendix 14)

At the start of the War the General Army Office, the Army Ordnance Office, and the Army Administration Office, which remained at Berlin, had been combined under the Commander of the Replacement Training Army, who also assumed command over the Replacement Training Army, and other troops and all agencies of the Army in the zone of the interior. According to the service regulations he was to control -- in line with directives from the Commander in Chief of the Army -- the replacements and equipment of the Army in respect to personnel (excluding officers, dealt with by the Army Personnel Office) materiel and finance, as well as the development, supply and delivery of arms, ammunition and war equipment, and all matters of Army administration. In addition he had complete command authority over the Replacement Training Army in every respect.

The service regulations of the Commander of the Replacement Training Army show that the Commander in Chief of the Army, in order to be able to devote all his time to the conduct of operations, relegated wide authority to the Commander of the Replacement Training Army. In the course of the War this authority was withdrawn in various important fields, as the expansion and prolongation of the War and the increasing difficulties

made it impossible for the Commander in Chief to confine himself to the conduct of operations alone. For the same reason the Chief of the Army General Staff found it increasingly necessary once again, as in time of peace, to take part in the replacement and armament services of the Army on the basis of his demands. The increasing shortage of all types of material made careful utilization for the purposes of the command imperative. Finally the above described changes in relationship between the Wehrmacht High Command and the Army High Command decisively influenced the position of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army. After the dismissal of the Commander in Chief of the Army, the number of agencies that addressed their demands, and frequently conflicting demands, to the Chief of the Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army increased steadily. Thus, in addition to the Army General Staff, Hitler, Keitel, the Inspector General of the Armored Troops and other agencies of the Wehrmacht High Command brought forward demands. Furthermore, control over the production of arms, ammunition and war equipment was transferred to the newly established Ministry for Armament and Ammunition in March 1940. The control of raw materials for arms, ammunition, motor vehicles and tanks was also transferred in April 1942 from the Wehrmacht High Command to this Ministry, which at the same time exercised a considerable influence on the development of the arms, so that the influence of the Wehrmacht High Command and of the Chief of the Army Armaments on the foundations of armaments gradually decreased. Beginning from 1944 the Chief of Army

Armaments lost all significance, and this became particularly true when, in December 1944, the Army Ordnance Office was taken from him and transferred in January 1945 to the newly created Chief of Wehrmacht Armaments in the Wehrmacht High Command. In this way the strategic command, namely, the Army General Staff was in an increasing measure prevented from having any influence on the instrument with which it was to conduct operations. However, it must be remembered that the conduct of operations had also more or less been taken away from the Army General Staff, which in the end was hardly more than an office where commands were written.

When, in 1944, the Reich Commander of the SS assumed command over the Replacement Training Army, the designation of COMMANDER OF THE REPLACEMENT TRAINING ARMY was changed into COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE REPLACEMENT TRAINING ARMY, who was directly responsible to Hitler.

To coordinate the activities of the offices and other agencies within the province of the Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of the Replacement Training Army was the responsibility of the Policy Section * of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of Replacement Training Army. The growing burden of problems connected with training, such as the supervision of cooperation of the arms inspectors with the corresponding agencies at the Army General Staff, the General Army Office, and the Army Ordnance Office, as well as with the schools, staffs and troops of the Replacement Training Army, exceeded the capacity of the section and on 1 October 1942 led to the appointment of the Chief of Training Affairs

* Stab Chef Heeresruestung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres.

(Chief of Training in the Replacement Training Army) to whom the arms inspectors, service schools, and instruction units in the Replacement Training Army were subordinated. When, at the end of 1944, the arms inspectors were reorganized (see definitions in chapter XII) the post of Chief of Training Affairs in the Replacement Training Army was abolished.

The increased demands by many agencies of the Army High Command for the development of arms and armaments led to an overburdening of the Policy Section of the Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of Replacement Training Army, as had happened in the case of training, and this led in 1942 to the establishment of a new post, that of the General with the Chief of Army Armaments. His function was to consolidate the armament and development requirements addressed to the Chief of Army Armament and Commander of Replacement Training Army, to coordinate them and to press for their fulfillment by the Army Ordnance Office or the Minister of Armaments and Ammunition.

The Chief of Army Legal Affairs assisted the Commander of the Replacement Training Army in his function as Highest Appointing Authority of the Replacement Training Army. In turn, he was assisted by the Army Judge Advocate Branch.

The Inspector of Army Training and Education *, who was in time of peace directly responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Army, was in

* At mobilization this post was temporarily designated INSPECTOR OF OFFICER CANDIDATE COURSES, as at that time all schools were closed and only officer candidate courses were to be conducted.

charge of the education and training of potential officers and noncommissioned officers. Furthermore, it was his mission to recruit new officers. On 1 March 1944 this inspector was taken over by the Inspector General for Potential Officers, who was chief of an office. The officer candidate schools, noncommissioned officer schools and preparatory schools for noncommissioned officers were under him.

The inspectors of arms and services(see appendix 15, supplementary to appendix 14), who in peacetime had been under the Commander in Chief of the Army and since the mobilization under the Commander of the Replacement Training Army, were transferred in 1942 to the Chief of Training in the Replacement Training Army until this latter post was abolished late in 1944. Further particulars on their position and functions will be given in chapter XII.

In 1939, shortly after mobilization, the Army Budget Branch and the Central Branch were transferred from the General Army Office to the Commander of the Replacement Training Army. The Budget Branch was expanded to a group in February 1944, and on 1 September 1944 was taken over by the Army Administration Office.

The Army Medical and Veterinary Inspectors were in a special position, inasmuch as they also performed functions for the Wehrmacht, and because they had no service general as a counterpart in the headquarters of the Army High Command. As Chief Army Medical Officer and Chief Army Veterinary Officer they themselves represented the demand of the Army Medical and Veterinary Services in the office of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration, Army General Staff.

Chapter VIII

The General Army Office

(Explanations to appendix 15)

In the wartime service regulations of the Chief of the General Army Office, the following missions were assigned to the General Army Office:

The General Army Office will handle the personnel, material and financial aspects of the replacement and armament affairs of the Army. * It will handle the replacement affairs of the entire armed forces in line with directives from the Wehrmacht High Command, will allocate replacement personnel for the Army to the replacement units for training, and will regulate the assignment of trained reserves for replacement of losses and for the activation of new units. In matters of armament production the General Army Office will make the necessary requisitions in agreement with the Army Ordnance Office, will submit to the Economic Staff, Wehrmacht High Command, suggestions for changes in the Wehrmacht production program and will dispatch the required armaments for the Army as directed by the Army Chief Supply and Administration Officer, Army General Staff, acting for the Commander in Chief of the Army. Furthermore it will stipulate the requirements and give instructions for the development of military equipment in the Army Ordnance Office. For training purposes the General Army Office, acting on directives from

* The handling of financial affairs was taken over by the Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of Replacement Training Army soon after the mobilization.

the Army General Staff on the authorization of the Commander in Chief of the Army will prepare the training regulations for the individual arms. The General Army Office will fulfill the following missions for the entire Wehrmacht: replacement service (Group for Replacements and General Troop Matters), supply of horses (Riding and Driving Branch - Inspectorate 3), motor vehicles, fuel, rubber (Panzer Troops Branch - Inspectorate 6), problems of chemical and smoke agents (Chemical Warfare and Air Raid Protection Branch - Inspectorate 9), medical service (Medical Inspectorate), veterinary service (Veterinary Inspectorate). *

The General Army Office, which had to work in close coordination with the Army General Staff, was appropriately organized to handle these missions.

Essentially, the difference between the mission of the Army General Staff and that of the General Army Office was as follows:

The Army General Staff planned the conduct of operations and conducted the operations by means of commands to the command agencies of the field forces. Through the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army it requisitioned from the General Army Office and other offices replacements of men and horses, equipment, arms, ammunition and so forth for the maintenance of the Field Army. So far as possible the General Army Office fulfilled these demands and issued the corresponding orders to the agencies in the zone of the interior and to the Replacement Training Army.

---

* The branches handling the respective matters are given in parentheses.

The CENTRAL STAFF OF THE GENERAL ARMY OFFICE consolidated and coordinated the work of the subordinate departments. All activations of the peacetime Army, all activations and rehabilitations during war, as far as they were carried out in the zone of the interior or in certain occupied territories under the responsibility of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army, were prepared and ordered by the Central Staff of the General Army Office. The basic requirement was the procurement of the necessary personnel, arms, equipment, horses and motor vehicles. The departments handling these matters within the General Army Office were the Group for Replacements and General Troop Matters (for personnel), the Ordnance Inspectorate (for arms and equipment), the Riding and Driving Branch (for horses), and the Branch for Motorization of the Army -- redesignated the Motor Maintenance Troop Branch * -- (for motor vehicles). The other departments of the General Army Office handled the specific affairs of their arms, legal and disciplinary matters, medical and veterinary services. The orders to activate units were given to the deputy corps headquarters, which were simultaneously the Wehrkreis ** headquarters who carried them out through the troops of the Replacement Training Army, the recruiting offices and ordnance offices under their command. Special staffs from the General Army Office inspected the newly activated or rehabilitated units to insure that they were fit for employment.

In addition, the Central Staff of the General Army Office prepared

---

* Kraftfahrparktruppenabteilung.

** The basic military area in Germany, corresponding roughly to the former Corps Area in the USA.

the mobilization plans for the Army in peace as well as the annual directives for the implementation of the mobilization for carrying out the mobilization plan in line with the requirements of the Army General Staff. During the War, a special department of the Central Staff of the General Army Office in 1940-41 prepared the general regulations for demobilization.

Shortly after the beginning of the War it became necessary to have special organs for supervision of the discipline of all soldiers in the home area and in the occupied territories, especially on all means of transportation. This led to the institution of an Army Patrol Service, under the command of the General for Special Assignments IV. * This General was directly responsible to the Chief of the General Army Office.

As early as 1939, shortly after mobilization, the Budget and the Central Branches (the latter minus its Army Regulations Section) were placed under the Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of Replacement Training Army (see chapter VII). On 1 September 1944 they were transferred to the Army Administration Office.

From the Group for Replacements and General Troop Affairs, the important Replacement Affairs Branch, which handled the personnel replacement of the armed forces, was removed after 20 July 1944 and transferred to the Wehrmacht High Command as the Wehrmacht Recruiting and Replacement Office.

---

* Transferred to the Wehrmacht High Command on 1 March 1944 as Chief of the Wehrmacht Patrol Service.

The Army Ordnance Branch administered all military equipment from the moment when it was accepted from the factories after inspection by the Army Ordnance Office, and stored it at the Army Ordnance Depots ready for delivery to units or as supplies to the Field Army. The branch was also responsible for the preparation and storage of the ammunition at the ammunition depots.

The arms branches had been called ordnance inspectorates until the beginning of the War. On appendix 16 the designation has been stated which was introduced at the mobilization. As the activity of the arms inspectors was restricted during the War to the Replacement Training Army, the main work of the former inspectorates now consisted of cooperation in the organizational and ordnance engineering problems of the General Army Office. In addition, after the installation of the Chief of Training in the Replacement Training Army (see chapter VII) they were at his disposal for the handling of training affairs for their specific arms.

Among the arms branches of the General Army Office the Branch for Armored Forces, Cavalry and Motorization of the Army (Branch 6) occupied a prominent position. Apart from the affairs of its own arm it handled the entire motor vehicle service, including procurement of motor vehicles, fuel and rubber, not only for the Army, but for the entire armed forces. The Chief of Branch 6, General von Schell at the start of the War, was at the same time Plenipotentiary for Motor Transportation under the Four Year's Plan and Under-Secretary of State in the Reich Ministry for Rail and Road Communications, and in these capacities had missions

and authority extending far beyond the limits of the armed forces.

As early as in the autumn of 1939, the growing problems connected with the motorization of the Army and the armed forces in general made it necessary to expand the departments handling these matters. Under General von Schell, a new group was formed, the Group for Motor Transportation and Motorization of the Army. The following branches were placed under this Group:

Inspectorate 6, which was now nothing but an arms branch for armored troops and cavalry; the newly created Branch for Motorization of the Army, which took over from Branch 6 responsibility for the entire motor transport service and Branch 8, the Supply Transportation Branch.

The special mission of General von Schell, as Plenipotentiary for Motor Transportation, was to bring about a reduction in the number of types produced by the German motor vehicle industry. From 1935 on the number of motor vehicles produced at no time met the requirements of the armed forces. To bridge the gap between the production and the requirement of military type vehicles, civilian types had to be adapted and civilian motor vehicles had to be confiscated. A feature of the German motor vehicle production was that innumerable types were produced and all of them in relatively small numbers, and from sheer necessity these types were used in the armed forces. The maintenance of these vehicles and the procurement of spare parts proved almost impossible during the War. Branch 6 and later the Group for Motor Transportation and Motorization of the Army met with little success in their efforts to bring

order out of this confusion, as it was possible only to a limited extent to settle the problem of types and models under war conditions. The Plenipotentiary for Motor Transportation had very extensive powers, but as Hitler, owing to his own growing problems, lost interest in the activity of the Plenipotentiary during the War, the circles involved, including industry, the Waffen - SS, the National Socialist Party and civilian organizations, went their own ways, which were dictated by their own specific interests, in procuring motor vehicles, thereby gradually decreasing the effectiveness of the Plenipotentiary. Finally, in 1942, General von Schell was relieved of this responsibility. At the same time the Group for Motor Transportation and Motorization of the Army was dissolved and General von Schell was assigned other military missions. Branches 6 and 8 were placed immediately under the General Army Office as pure arms and services branches.

Owing to the mounting importance of motor transportation and particularly because of the growing lack of motor vehicles, tires, spare-parts, fuel, and the difficulties of a proper allocation according to actual requirements, it again became imperative to place at the head of the agencies handling these matters a person who, by reason of his seniority and his post, had a greater measure of authority than a branch chief. For this reason the Chief of Motorization * was appointed, who, on account of his rank and seniority and his authority as an inspector, was made directly responsible to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander

* General der Motorisierung.

of the Replacement Training Army. The former Branch for Army Motorisation was redesignated the Motor Transportation Branch (Inspectorate 12) and subordinated to the General of Motorization, but remained a department of the General Army Office. As an Army High Command agency, the Chief of Motorization received his directives relating to the activity of Branch 12, so far as they affected the Army, through the General Army Office. In all matters of the Wehrmacht he was designated the Chief of Motorization in the Wehrmacht High Command and was responsible directly to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command. In March 1943 his designation was changed to Chief of Wehrmacht Transportation. In the name of the Chief, Wehrmacht High Command he could give commands also to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army. At the same time the entire maintenance service was withdrawn from Branch 12 and transferred to a special branch under a Chief of Motor Maintenance, as an agency of the Wehrmacht High Command under the Chief of Motorization at the Wehrmacht High Command.

In addition, the Chief of Motorization was the successor of the Plenipotentiary for Motor Transportation in his post as Commissioner for Motor Transportation in the Four Year's Plan, but his powers in this capacity were considerably smaller than those of the Plenipotentiary had been.

This confusing situation caused much friction, all the more so because, apart from the Army General Staff, the Inspector General of the Armored Troops also made demands on behalf of the Army (see appendix 1,

Service Regulations of the Inspector General of Armored Troops). In 1944 the joint agency of the Chief of Wehrmacht Motor Transportation and the Chief of Motorization was separated. Whereas the Chief of Wehrmacht Transportation was taken over entirely by the Wehrmacht High Command, the Chief of Motorization remained in the General Army Office under the new designation Chief Army Motor Transport Officer at the Army High Command (later again redesignated Chief Motor Transport Officer with the Commander of the Replacement Training Army) together with the Branch 12, and handled only Army missions.

At the end of 1939 the handling of the personnel files of the technical officials of the Army had been taken over from the Army Administration Office, and this had led to the creation of the Branch for Technical Officials of the Army (Inspectorate T). This change had been made in consequence of the changed legal position of the technical officials of the Army (Motor transport engineers with troops). When these officials were taken into the officer corps in 1943 or 1944 Inspectorate T disappeared again. Handling of the personnel files was now transferred to Group 6 of the Army Personnel Office. (See appendix 8, lines 20 and 23.)

Chapter IX

The Army Ordnance Office.

(Explanations to appendix 18)

The wartime service regulations assigned the following missions to the Chief of the Army Ordnance Office: He was responsible for the development, procurement and acceptance of the arms, ammunition, and military equipment of the Army, and in part for the other branches of the armed forces, as well as for the expansion and the capacity of the assigned armament factories. He was adviser to the Commander in Chief of the Army, and had the right to report directly to him. The basis for procurements was the production plan prepared by the Wehrmacht High Command. The Chief of the Army Ordnance Office was subordinate to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army. He contacted the Wehrmacht High Command directly in the following matters:

a) Allocation of raw materials and substitute materials.

b) Assignment and construction of new production plants.

c) Procurement of the necessary personnel for the armament industry.

d) Verification of prices.

The position of the Army Ordnance Office within the Army High Command was characterized by the fact that it received the requisitions of the arms and services branches of General Army Office relating to the

development of arms and equipment and the quantities to be produced, and obtained approval from the General Army Office for its own suggestions. The program of the office, as it existed in 1938, was the logical consequence of these responsibilities. It was as follows:

1) Development and examination of the intentions and of test specimens.

2) Supervision of the production by the armament industry.

3) Technical preparations by the Chief Ordnance Engineer.

4) Testing of the equipment produced by the industry.

5) Acceptance of the output from the manufacturers.

In March 1940 the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition was created, which led to a parallel service to which the Army Ordnance Office had to adapt itself. As a result, the Chief Ordnance Engineer Branch and the Acceptance Branch were expanded into groups (see appendix 19, supplementary to appendix 18) and the Group for Armament Industry, which had grown too big, was separated into a Group for Weapons and Equipment Manufacture and a Group for Ammunition Manufacture (see appendix 21, supplementary to appendix 18). These groups communicated directly with the corresponding departments of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition. The Chief of the Army Ordnance Office was consulted only when difficulties arose and prior to decisions of fundamental importance. At the same time the Central Group had been created (see appendix 19, supplementary to appendix 18), through which the Chief of the Army Ordnance Office exerted his influence on the armament industry; in this

way the Central Staff of the Army Ordnance Office was relieved of some of its work. The Staff handled the centralized planning, the distribution of raw material allocated to the Army, the preparation of drafts and reports for submission to the Wehrmacht High Command, the Commander in Chief of the Army, the Chief of Army Equipment, and the Commander of the Replacement Training Army and the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition. Furthermore, it handled statistics, security against espionage, personnel and similar affairs. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of Replacement Training Army had established an agency within his staff to keep him personally informed on the distribution of raw material. The chief of this agency was at the same time at the head of the corresponding agency in the Army Ordnance Office until 1942 or 1943.

In 1943 it became necessary to partition the Development and Testing Group as it had become too extensive. (See appendix 20, supplementary to appendix 18).

In September 1943 the responsibilities of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition were considerably widened and the name of the Ministry changed to Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production. The Army armament plants were transferred to it by the Army Ordnance Office, so that the Army Raw Materials Center * (see tenth line, appendix 19, supplementary to appendix 18) now came under the ministry.

---

* Abteilung Chef Ingenieur 2.

Toward the end of the War, in mid-February 1945, the Army Ordnance Office was withdrawn from the control of the Army High Command and placed under the Chief of Wehrmacht Armaments as the Wehrmacht Ordnance Office. This change in the chain of command was combined with a complete reorganization of the office, a reorganization which had not been fully carried out at the end of the War. As the Chief of Wehrmacht Armaments in the planned reorganization was to be responsible not only for development, testing, production and acceptance but also for the maintenance of arms and equipment, and the storing of ammunition in the ordnance depots, parts of the Army Ordnance Inspectorate of the General Army Office were transferred to the Wehrmacht Ordnance Office. The organization of the Wehrmacht Ordnance Office is shown in appendix 22, supplementary to appendix 18.

Chapter X

The Army Administration Office.

(Explanations to appendix 23)

The Army Administration Office, within the Army High Command, handled all administrative affairs of the Army relating to:

Finance and accounting.

Officials, employees and workmen.

Billets, billeting requirements and landed property at the garrisons and the troop training grounds, including administration of forests and regulation of hunting.

Building matters.

Rationing (for Army and Luftwaffe).

Control of materials (textiles and leather) for clothing and equipment (excluding weapons) of enlisted personnel.

In wartime the office had the additional responsibility for the procurement of food and other living requirements for the field forces and their storage in the reserve ration supply depots and at the administrative offices of Army garrisons. In close cooperation with the Army Chief Administration Officer on the staff of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration, these supplies had to be kept ready for dispatch to the Field Army on requisition by the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.

According to the mobilization regulations the Chief of the Army Administration Office was at the same time to be the Chief of the Armed Forces Administration at the Wehrmacht High Command and in this capacity had to

issue the basic directives for the administration and supply of the entire armed forces. However, this regulation was cancelled by the Wehrmacht High Command a short time before or after the mobilization and the Chief of the Army Administration Office was restricted in his responsibilities for all branches of the armed forces to the control of textiles, leather and provisions. This meant that the Chief of the Army Administration Office could not issue orders on behalf of the Wehrmacht High Command, but could only draft orders for approval and signature by the Chief, Wehrmacht High Command. In the General Wehrmacht Office, within the Wehrmacht High Command, the Group for Wehrmacht Administration handled all administrative matters of the Wehrmacht not handled by the administrative offices of the individual branches of the Armed Forces, as in case described above. The Chief of the Army Administration Office believed that the responsibility alone, without command authority would not enable him to represent the interests of the entire armed forces properly, as the other branches of the armed forces would not grant him the authority to control the implementation of his commands. The disputes about these matters between the Chief of the Army Administration Office, the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and the other branches of the armed forces were one of the reasons for the removal of the Chief of the Army Administration Office from his post. After the appointment of the Reich Commander of the SS as Commander of the Replacement Training Army in 1944, a senior SS officer was appointed successor to the Chief of the Army Administration Office on 1 November 1944. This new chief was furnished extensive command authority in his

relations with the branches of the armed forces, the Waffen - SS, the police, the National Socialist Party and other civilian institutions.

In appendix 23 the agencies of the Army Administration Office have been entered in the order corresponding to the organization existing on 1 November 1944. Possible changes after that date are not known. The chain of command within the office may be gathered from the nature of the designations of the agencies.

Chapter XI

Other Agencies of the Army High Command which were immediately responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Army, to Hitler in his capacities of Fuehrer and Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, or to the Chief, Wehrmacht High Command.

(Explanations to appendix 23)

Particulars about the position of the Inspector General of the Armored Troops within the Army High Command have been given in chapter IV and further details will be given in chapter XII.

The Chief of the National Socialist Guidance Staff of the Army, directly responsible to Hitler, held a post that had been newly created on 22 December 1943, probably with the intention of raising the morale of the troops through propaganda. When establishing this agency a considerable part of the Army Affairs Branch, hitherto under the General acting as special assistant to the Commander in Chief of the Army was transferred to the new Staff. The department of the Chief of the National Socialist Guidance Staff was organized in three branches, among which the functions were distributed as follows:

Branch I: Reports on the morale and condition of the troops. *

* The Organizational Branch of the Army General Staff required troop condition reports from all divisions and corresponding units each month since the beginning of the War. These reports indicated in diagrams the condition of the troops both in respect to personnel and materiel, in order to keep the command informed on their value. The reports ended with a short evaluation by the division commander of the state of training and under given circumstances of their morale, with a comment by the next higher superior. These reports were also placed at the disposal of the National Socialist Guidance Staff.

Improving the morale of the troops.

Developing the aggressiveness of the troops by such means as influencing the selection of books and periodicals. The supervision of public relations of the Army in the press and other propaganda mediums was not the mission of the National Socialist Guidance Staff but of the Wehrmacht High Command.

Branch IIa: Personnel files of the National Socialist Guidance Office personnel and of the National Socialist Guidance officers.

Branch III: This branch had been taken over from the Army Affairs Branch and handled special services for the troops, such as the supply of wares for the canteens, gift parcels, cinemas and soldier hostels, and had to communicate with the bereaved of those killed in action.

The National Socialist Guidance Office was a singular feature inasmuch as it was the only establishment within the Army that had its own service channels to the troops. The National Socialist Guidance officers attached to Army Group, army and corps headquarters staffs and the corresponding staffs in the Replacement Training Army were the only persons not subordinate to the appropriate chiefs of staffs, but were immediately responsible to the commander in chief or the commanding general. The hitherto strictly adhered to principle in the German Army, to assign all staff work in each higher level staff to a responsible chief of staff, had thus been abandoned for the first time.

The general acting as special assistant to the Commander in Chief of the Army had in the beginning (1940-41) been assigned special missions

according to circumstances, as, for instance, the preparation of proposals for the adjustment of training in the Replacement Training Army to the requirements and demands of the Field Army; investigation of the internal service routine in field and home hospitals; examination of the composition of new field units, in respect to personnel and equipment; protection of military interests * in the implementation of laws.

To assist him in this latter mission, the general acting as special assistant to the Commander in Chief of the Army was assigned to the Legal Section, hitherto under the Army Chief Supply and Administration Officer.

In 1941 the following sections were formed and assigned to the general acting as special assistant:

1) The Staff Officer Section, which had the mission of propagandizing the Army by means of literary contributions from the field forces (essays, newspaper articles, illustrated articles), which were forwarded to the Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch of the Wehrmacht High Command.

2) The General Section (Field Army), which handled affairs connected with the execution of sentences in the field forces (penal rehabilitation battalions and so forth).

In the spring of 1942 the Army Affairs Branch was transferred from Assistant Chief of Staff IV (in charge of intelligence) of the Army General Staff to the general acting as special assistant to the Commander

* The German term used TRUPPENDIENSTLICHE BELANGE included training, exercise of disciplinary authority, miscellaneous administrative and troop welfare matters.

in Chief of the Army. It handled matters of troop discipline (reporting, for instance, on lack of discipline in consequence of unsatisfactory arrangement of home leave), inner-political affairs, such as friction between agencies of the field forces and of the National Socialist Party, and special services for the troops (until this latter field of activity was transferred to the Chief of the National Socialist Guidance Staff). A liaison officer of Foreign Intelligence Office of the Wehrmacht High Command was assigned to the Army Affairs Branch, to handle security against espionage in the field forces.

The departments and groups assigned to the general acting as special assistant to the Commander in Chief of the Army worked independently and on their own responsibility in coordination with the corresponding agencies of the Wehrmacht and Army High Commands. Thus, for instance, the Legal Section collaborated with the Army Judge Advocate Branch of the General Army Office (see appendix 16), the Penal Section with the Branch for General Troop Matters of the General Army Office (see appendix 16), Group for Staff Officers with the Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch of the Wehrmacht High Command.

The mission of the general acting as special assistant was to report to the Commander in Chief of the Army on important events concerning the fields of activity of these agencies, to enforce the demands of the Commander in Chief, and to coordinate the work of the agencies. The only one of these agencies which was in a position different from that of the others was the Army Affairs Branch which had been a branch of the Army General

Staff until the spring of 1942. It remained mandatory for this branch to report directly to the Chief of the Army General Staff, who had reserved the right to issue instructions directly to it.

Chapter XII

The Representation of the various Arms in the Army High Command.

(See appendices 13, 15 and 16)

In peace the arms and services inspectors were the highest representatives of their respective arms. They were immediately responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Army and under his authority supervised the training of their arms. Their requirements for training, organization, personnel, equipment and armaments were addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Army. The Arms Inspectorates served as their working staffs. The Commander in Chief instructed the Army General Staff (specifically the Organizational and Training Branches) to examine these requirements to insure that they corresponded to the over-all development program. After this check the requisitions were forwarded to the General Army Office, which controlled the financial means and the material, for examination as to their feasibility and finally submitted them to the Commander in Chief of the Army for decision. To carry out changes on the basis of such decisions was the task of the General Army Office, which availed itself of the ordnance inspectorates under it for this purpose. Thus, the arms inspectorates were subordinate to their Ordnance Inspectors as working staffs, and at the same time to the General Army Office as arms branches. The chiefs of staffs of the inspectorates were at the same time chiefs of the corresponding branches of the General Army Office.

The requirements in respect to materiel (development of arms, equipment and ammunition, volume of production) were forwarded by the General Army Office to the Army Ordnance Office, where the orders were carried out by the appropriate branches of the Group for Weapons and Equipment Matters. (See appendices 20 and 21). In the Army Personnel Office, with which the Inspectorates had to work in close cooperation, the sections were likewise arranged according to arms and services for handling the personnel files of the officers of various arms and services.

At the beginning of the War no immediate change took place in this respect, because the preparations for the mobilization did not envisage a long war. The only change was that the inspectors were subordinated to the Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of the Replacement Training Army. In their service regulations they were assigned the following responsibilities:

Supervision of training in the Replacement Training Army in line with the directives of the Army General Staff.

Transmission to the Replacement Training Army of experiences gained by the field forces. This was done by means of tours to the fronts.

Preparation of regulations for their respective arms and services. This work was done by the arms branches in the General Army Office, which served the inspectors as working staffs.

The arms and services inspectorates had been redesignated branches, because the activity of the arms and service inspectors was generally limited to the Replacement Training Army, while the main work of the arms service branches was to handle the missions assigned to them by the General

Army Office.

Shortly after the outbreak of war it became evident that this arrangement was not satisfactory and that the arms and service branches needed representation at the Headquarters of the Army High Command. This is why the posts of Chiefs of Arms and Services with the Commander in Chief * of the Army were created as early as October 1939. These chiefs were subordinate to the Chief of the Army General Staff, as will be seen from appendix 13. ** Their mission was to collect the experiences of their respective arms and services by means of frequent visits to the front and to disseminate them in the field forces through instructional pamphlets and regulations, or to transmit them to the arms and services inspectors for utilization in training within the Replacement Training Army. In addition, close contact with various arms and services of the Field Army and of the Replacement Training Army (but not the infantry or the artillery) existed by virtue of the fact that the appropriate chief was at the same time Arms Inspector, or as a result of special measures. This applied to the engineers, the railway engineers, the Signal Corps, the Railway Operating Troops, and the Supply Troops. On the basis of experience, the chiefs also had to submit requirements in respect to the organization, armaments, and equipment of their appropriate arms and services. These requirements had

---

* Waffengenerale beim Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres.

** After abolishment of the post of Commander in Chief of the Army, in December 1941, redesignated Chiefs of Arms and Services with the Chief of the Army General Staff, and in February 1945 again redesignated Chiefs of Arms and Services with the Army High Command.

Army Office.

Shortly after the outbreak of war it became evident that this arrangement was not satisfactory and that the arms and service branches needed representation at the Headquarters of the Army High Command. This is why the posts of Chiefs of Arms and Services with the Commander in Chief * of the Army were created as early as October 1939. These chiefs were subordinate to the Chief of the Army General Staff, as will be seen from appendix 13. ** Their mission was to collect the experiences of their respective arms and services by means of frequent visits to the front and to disseminate them in the field forces through instructional pamphlets and regulations, or to transmit them to the arms and services inspectors for utilization in training within the Replacement Training Army. In addition, close contact with various arms and services of the Field Army and of the Replacement Training Army (but not the infantry or the artillery) existed by virtue of the fact that the appropriate chief was at the same time Arms Inspector, or as a result of special measures. This applied to the engineers, the railway engineers, the Signal Corps, the Railway Operating Troops, and the Supply Troops. On the basis of experience, the chiefs also had to submit requirements in respect to the organization, armaments, and equipment of their appropriate arms and services. These requirements had

---

* Waffengenerale beim Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres.

** After abolishment of the post of Commander in Chief of the Army, in December 1941, redesignated Chiefs of Arms and Services with the Chief of the Army General Staff, and in February 1945 again redesignated Chiefs of Arms and Services with the Army High Command.

to be transmitted, as in peacetime, through the departments of the Army General Staff, who examined them and forwarded them to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army, unless they were required for the field forces. The work of the chiefs of arms and services with the Commander in Chief of the Army increased during the War, because training activities within the field forces grew as a result of the expansion of the War and its long duration. The Field Army established its own schools and instruction courses, and units were stationed in the occupied territories for rehabilitation or reorganization or for employment as instruction divisions, so that a new field of activities developed for the chiefs.

Around the turn of the year 1944-45 the position of the chiefs of arms and services underwent a change. In order to bring about closer contact between the Field Army and the Replacement Training Army for all their arms and services, the arms and service inspectors in the Replacement Training Army were subordinated to the chiefs of arms and services. In this way the chiefs of arms and services with the Army High Command, as they were called from now on, were no longer subordinate only to the Chief of the Army General Staff, but at the same time to the Commander of the Replacement Training Army in matters relating to training in the Replacement Training Army. The Commander of the Replacement Training Army established the principal aims of instruction and the duration of the basic training.

Apart from these basic principles which were equally valid for all

arms and services, special conditions prevailed within the individual arms and services, some of which were as follows:

1) The Chief Artillery Officer with the Commander in Chief of the Army was, apart from his other tasks, at the same time adviser to the Commander in Chief or to the Chief of the Army General Staff on the employment of the artillery. In close cooperation with him, the Operations Branch ordered the employment of the OHQ artillery, the army coast artillery and the fortress artillery. The Chief Army Coast Artillery, Fortress Artillery, Army antiaircraft Artillery, Armored Artillery and Assault Gun Officers, which posts were created later, were controlled by him.

2) Representation of the Armored Troops (called Mobile Troops until about 1943) within the Army High Command, which underwent several changes. From the autumn of 1938 until the start of the War there was a Chief of Mobile Troops, who had considerably larger powers than the arms and service inspectors. He had a staff of his own, which was independent of the Inspectorate of Mobile Troops. His mission was to stress in the Army High Command the importance of developing his arm, which was still a new arm. By the authority of the Commander in Chief of the Army he could issue training orders to the mobile troops. The schools of the mobile troops were controlled by him and it was his responsibility to define the still vague concepts as to the tactical possibilities in the employment of the new arm. The large maneuvers intended for the mobile troops in the autumn of 1939 were to have been directed by him. At the start of the

War the post of Chief of Mobile Troops was abolished and their representation at the Army High Command was organized in the same way as that of the other arms and services. In March 1940, the post of a Chief Mobile Troops Officer with the Commander in Chief of the Army was created at the headquarters of the Army High Command.

In February or March 1943 an Inspector General of the Armored Troops was appointed by order of Hitler, to whom the Inspector General was to be personally responsible for"a further development of the armored troops on a scale commensurate with their decisive importance in the war". The defeat at Stalingrad was to be counterbalanced by a great effort. For this purpose the Inspector General of Armored Troops was separated from the Army High Command and furnished extensive powers (service regulations see appendix 1). A specially important point is that he was not under the Chief of the Army General Staff, with whom he had to "be in agreement" only in respect to the organization and training of his arm. So far as the technical development and the production program for his arm were concerned, he was not bound to any other military agency, but, "acting in close collaboration with the Reich Ministry of Arms and Ammunition," had to report directly to Hitler. All replacements for the armored troops were placed under him and he was granted a decisive influence on the man power available in the zone of the interior.

With the appointment of the Inspector General of Armored Troops the post of Inspector of the Mobile Troops, hitherto under the Commander of the Replacement Training Army, was abolished and in March 1943 the newly

created Inspector of Armored Troops was placed directly under the Inspector General of Armored Troops. The Armored Troops Branch (Insp. 6) * was subordinate to the Inspector of Armored Troops and at the same time to the General Army Office. Armored Troop Commanders were appointed within all deputy corps headquarters, who were, however, responsible to the Inspector of Armored Troops in all training matters and all officer personnel affairs of the armored replacement training units.

The very extensive powers of the Inspector General of Armored Troops (see cipher 7 of his service regulations in appendix 1) gave rise to much friction, for instance, in connection with the allocation of replacements by the Wehrkreise**, which received their orders in this respect from the Commander of the Replacement Training Army through the General Army Office (see appendix 5).

There can be no doubt that the extensive authority of their chief representative gave the armored troops a great advantage over the other arms, whereby their fighting value was considerably increased.

After the appointment of the Inspector General of the Armored Troops the Chief of the Army General Staff was without a representative of the armored troops in his office. For this reason an Armored Troops Officer with the Chief of the Army General Staff was temporarily appointed.

---

* Hitherto the Mobile Troops Branch (Insp. 6).

** The basic military area in Germany, in some respects similar to the former corps areas in the United States.

3) Before the War, and during the War until 15 October 1939, the engineers, railway engineers and fortresses were represented by a single inspector, General Jacob. At his disposal were the three corresponding arms branches or inspectorates in the General Army Office, namely, Branch 5 (Engineer Branch), Branch 10 (Railway Engineer Branch) and the Inspector of Fortification and, after his appointment, the newly created, Inspector of Engineers and Railway Engineers. On 15 October 1939 General Jacob was appointed Chief of Engineers and Fortification with the Commander in Chief of the Army, while at the same time retaining his position as Inspector of Fortification with the Commander of the Replacement Training Army.

The General of Railway Operating Troops with the Chief of the Army Transportation was appointed as representative of the Railway Engineers at the Army High Command Headquarters.

The Chief of Engineers and Fortifications with the Commander in Chief of the Army was adviser to the Commander in Chief of the Army or to the Chief of the Army General Staff in all matters relating to engineers and fortifications. In close collaboration with the Chief of Engineers and Fortifications, the Operations Branch controlled the employment of GHQ engineer and engineer construction units. In November 1944 an officer was again appointed to the post of Inspector of Fortification with the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Training Army, an Inspector of Engineer Construction Troops having been established beforehand, while the designation was still Commander of the Replacement Training Army.

4) The Chief of Chemical Troops with the Commander in Chief of the Army was the adviser to the Commander in Chief or to the Chief of the Army General Staff on the employment of his arm. In close collaboration with him, the Operation Branch controlled the employment of the Chemical Troops, which were later designated Projector Troops /Werfertruppe/.

5) The intended reorganization and consolidation of the staffs under the Army Chief Signal Officer and Wehrmacht Chief Signal Officer and his appointment as an arms chief with the designation Chief of Signal Forces with the Wehrmacht High Command and the Army High Command was not fully carried out. It brought about the clarification of the organization of functions as follows: (see chapter VI, page 38).

a) Command missions of the signal communications for all theaters of war, were to be handled under the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, by the former staff of the Army Chief Signal Officer.

b) Administrative work of the signal communications for all three branches of the Wehrmacht was to be handled by the Wehrmacht Communication Group in the Wehrmacht High Command.

c) Personnel and equipment affairs of the Replacement Training Army were to be handled by the Signal Communications Group of the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Training Army, which Group would have had to be subordinated also to the Chief of Signal Forces with the Wehrmacht High Command and the Army High Command.

Owing to the special position of the Army Chief Signal Officer, the

Signal Corps had powerful representation in both the Wehrmacht High Command and the Army High Command. This powerful representation was necessary for the fulfillment of its manifold missions, which were closely intertwined with the confusing circumstances ruling at the top command levels of the armed forces.

Owing to the skilful organization of its top levels and the prominent personality of its representative, General der Nachrichtentruppe Fellgiebel, the signal corps was able to meet all requirements fully during the War even under the most strenuous circumstances.

6) The Luftwaffe General with the Commander in Chief of the Army was not an arms or service chief of the Army, but an agency of the Luftwaffe. The post was created at the beginning of the War, and for tactical purposes the Luftwaffe General was subordinate to the Chief of the Army General Staff. His missions were as follows:

a) Liaison between the Commanders in Chief of Luftwaffe and of the Army, to the latter of whom he acted as adviser in all matters of cooperation between the two branches. However, from the outset this function was never of importance, as it was performed by liaison officers and by direct communication between the chiefs of the Army and Luftwaffe General Staffs, the chiefs of the Operational Branches and so forth.

b) Command of the reconnaissance aircraft and antiaircraft artillery units tactically assigned to the Army. In this capacity he directed the employment of his units and, in addition, was responsible for all matters connected with their organization, training, command and discipline.

c) Collection of the reconnaissance results obtained by his reconnaissance squadrons and those of the Commander in Chief of the Air Forces, and submission thereof to the Commander in Chief of the Army or to the Chief of the Army General Staff.

In the spring of 1942 this arrangement was changed in that, owing to the lack of forces, the air reconnaissance forces were taken from the Army and again placed under the Luftwaffe. From now on they were directed solely to cooperate with the appropriate headquarters of the army in the field. The reconnaissance results obtained by the Luftwaffe were now evaluated for the Army High Command by the Intelligence Section of the Luftwaffe Staff with the Army High Command, which section was assigned to the Foreign Armies (East) Branch.

7) The Chief of Volunteer units with the Army High Command. The enlistment of former Russian prisoners of war and of volunteers from the population of the occupied eastern territories as "voluntary auxiliaries" or in specific "eastern" units, led to the creation of this agency. It was responsible for the handling of these eastern units and volunteers * in the Field Army and in the Replacement Training Army. For the performance of his functions in the Replacement Training Army the Commander of the Volunteer units with the Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of Replacement Training Army was subordinate to him.

---

* The eastern units of the Army had nothing to do with the foreign units of the Waffen - SS.

8) The Commander of the Mapping and Survey Units controlled his units in the Field Army. He was subordinate to the Chief of Mapping and Survey Affairs, stationed at Berlin. The Commander of the Mapping and Survey Units was at headquarters of the Army High Command, where he acted at the same time as the field agency of the Chief of Mapping and Survey Affairs and maintained liaison between the latter and the Chief of the Army General Staff.

9) The Chief of Technical Troops was under the Army Supply and Administration Officer, and was the Commander of Technical Troops. *

10) The Armored Trains, which were first organized during the War, were controlled by the Commander of Armored Trains at the Headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command. He was initially placed under the Chief of Mobile Troops until the latter post was abolished at the end of February 1943. From then on the Commander of the Armored Trains was immediately responsible to the Chief of the Army General Staff (see appendix 13, supplementary to appendix 4). Apart from his position as a commander of troops he performed the functions of a chief of his arm within the Army High Command in close cooperation with the Inspector General of the Armored Troops and the Army Chief of the Transportation.

11) In addition to the Railway Engineers mentioned under item 3, above, the Railway Operating Troops had been organized during the War. They were subordinate to the Chief of the Army Chief of Transportation, who thereby had the capacity of a troop commander apart from his other

* These were the technical battalions responsible for the maintenance and operation of vital public utilities, such as water, gas and electricity works, of the towns within the operational areas.

tanks. He controlled the railway operating troops and all railway transport offices of the Field Army and of the Replacement Training Army.

Appendix 1

Service Regulations of the Inspector General of the Armored Troops.

1) The Inspector General of the Armored Troops is responsible to me for the continued development of the armored forces in conformity with the decisive importance of that arm in the War.

The Inspector General of the Armored Troops is directly responsible to me. He has the rank of a commanding general of an army and is the highest military commander of the armored troops. *

2) The Inspector General of the Armored Troops will direct the organization and training of the armored troops and the large mobile units of the Army in agreement with the Chief of the Army General Staff. He also has the right to issue instructions by my order to the Luftwaffe and the Waffen - SS concerning the organization and training of the armored troops.

Fundamental decisions I reserve to myself.

His demands as to technical development of his arms and the planning of production he will report to me, in close cooperation with the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, for decision.

3) In his capacity of senior officer of his arm he at the same time will be in command of the Replacement Training units of his arm. It will

* For the purposes of this service regulation the term armored troops /Panzertruppen/ will include armored units, armored and mechanized infantry, motorized infantry, armored reconnaissance units, antitank forces and heavy assault gun units.

be his mission to currently secure fully efficient replacements in personnel and armored vehicles for the field forces, from individual vehicles to the requirements for the rehabilitation of old or the activation of new units.

The allocation of tanks and armored vehicles to the field forces and the Replacement Training Army in line with my directives will be his responsibility.

4) The Inspector General of the Armored Troops will insure that all activations of new units or rehabilitation of existing units of the armored or mobile forces are carried out according to plans and time schedules. To this end he will insure, in agreement with the Chief, Army General Staff, that all tank crews of the Field Army that have no tanks will be appropriately employed.

5) The Inspector General of the Armored Troops will evaluate the war experience for the benefit of the command, the armament, the training and the organization of the armored troops. He will have the right to visit and inspect all armored units of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen - SS in the field forces.

The armored units of the field forces will report directly to the Inspector General of the Armored Troops on all experiences. He will make all his observations and experiences known to all appropriate agencies, including the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition.

The Inspector General of the Armored Troops will direct the preparation of all regulations for the armored troops. When issuing regulations

concerning the command of units and coordination with other arms, he will act in agreement with the Chief of the Army General Staff.

6) Permanently subordinate to the Inspector General of the Armored Troops are the following:

a) The replacement training units of the mobile troops (except cavalry and bicycle replacement units) which are combined under special command headquarters.

b) The schools for mobile troops (excluding establishments for cavalry and bicycle units) of the field forces and the Replacement Training Army and the instruction units belonging to them.

7) The Inspector General of the Armored Troops is authorized to issue binding instructions within the scope of his jurisdiction to all agencies of the Army. All agencies are required to make available to the Inspector General of the Armored Troops any records he may need.

Fuehrer Headquarters, 28 February 1943

The Fuehrer

/s/ Adolf Hitler.

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10501

Appendices omitted from this copy will be found in the German Original.